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As the connection between an individual’s socioeconomic status and electoral participation 
originates from the socialization process in childhood and adolescence, inequalities in voting are 
often argued to be relatively stable throughout the life cycle. However, social mobility during 
adulthood may mitigate the effects of family background. Using individual-level register-based 
data, this study examines the extent to which changes in adults’ social class and income between 
2000 and 2011 influenced voting propensity in the 2012 Finnish municipal elections. The results 
show that turnout among socially mobile voters settles between the stable members of their 
socioeconomic group of origin and destination. Our findings imply that intra-generational social 
and economic mobility can constrain the socioeconomic gradient in turnout.  
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As widely recognized among scholars of political behavior, various forms of social inequality are 
directly reflected in political participation (Wass and Blais, 2016). An important aspect of this 
phenomenon relates to inter-generational transmission of disadvantage. Patterns of participation 
are passed on from parents to offspring through learning from parental behavior and transmission 
of socioeconomic resources (e.g. Bhatti and Hansen, 2012; Brady et al., 2015; Cesarini et al., 
2014; Gidengil et al., 2016; Pacheco, 2008; Pacheco and Plutzer, 2008; Quintelier, 2015; Verba 
et al., 2005). Furthermore, differences in levels of political activity seem relatively persistent 
during individuals’ life cycles (Brady et al. 2015; Plutzer 2002), which implies that inequalities 
originating from pre-adult characteristics may cause a permanent bias in participation (Gidengil 
et al., 2016). 
 
In this study, we argue that the overall picture might not be so gloomy. If social and economic 
resources received later in life can compensate for uneven pre-adult prerequisites for political 
participation, intra-generational social mobility would mitigate the inequalities stemming from 
childhood conditions. Although acknowledged in the previous literature (Brady et al., 2015), the 
potential effect of intra-generational social mobility has not yet been examined empirically. More 
specifically, we concentrate on the gradient-constraint hypothesis, originally discovered in 
population health studies (Bartley and Plewis, 1997; 2007; Blane et al., 1999; Elstad, 2001; for 
adaptation to another field, see Plewis and Bartley 2014). Applied to electoral participation, 
gradient constraint would mean that turnout among upwardly mobile individuals is higher 
compared to the stable members of their class of origin but lower compared to their class of 
destination. The situation would be reversed among those whose class status has shifted 
downwards. As a result, these two types of social mobility would reduce the socioeconomic bias 
in electoral participation. 
 
To test the gradient-constraint hypothesis, we use a unique dataset that links individual-level 
voting records from the 2012 Finnish municipal elections with information on socioeconomic 
background characteristics compiled by Statistics Finland. On the bases of personal identification 
codes, individuals’ social class and income in 2000 and 2011 are matched to voting in the 1999 
Finnish parliamentary elections in the dataset. Using actual voting records means that our data are 
not subject to the bias characteristic to self-reported turnout, such as misreporting due to faulty 
recall, or over-reporting due to social desirability (Karp and Brockington, 2005; Swaddle and 
Heath, 1989). Also, the over-reporting of turnout related to the self-selection of the survey 
respondents (Sciarini and Goldberg 2016) is avoided. Neither do the data suffer from potential 
misreporting stemming from respondents’ recollections of their past social class and income.  
 
In what follows, we first discuss the concept of gradient constraint and its applicability in the 
study of turnout. Next, the data and research design are introduced, followed by presentation of 
our main results. We conclude by discussing the implications of the findings.  
 
 
Gradient constraint and voting  
 
Originally, the concept of gradient constraint was developed in the field of health inequalities. Its 
basic logic is relatively simple, reflecting the association between an individual’s health status 
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and socioeconomic position. As the original socioeconomic composition of healthy and less 
healthy citizens differ from each other, social mobility takes place between social groups with 
different levels of health (Bartley and Plewis, 1997, 377). A gradient-constraint hypothesis 
assumes that the health status of the upwardly mobile is better compared to members of their 
original social class but worse compared to members of their new class. Correspondingly, those 
moving downwards have worse health profiles than those who stay in their previous social class, 
although they are still healthier than stayers in their social class of destination. Should this be the 
case, social mobility mitigates the health disparities between different social classes (Bartley and 
Plewis, 1997). 
 
In his contribution, Elstad (2001) argued that the social class-health association has to meet three 
prerequisites in order to have such an alleviating effect: 1) there should be considerable 
differences in outcome, 2) the overall rate of intra-generational social mobility in the population 
needs to be high, and 3) there should be a clear direction of causation. Although the gradient-
constraint hypothesis has not been tested with regard to political participation and voting, the 
class-turnout case fulfills these conditions.  
 
First, numerous studies have reported a class bias in turnout (for review, e.g. Wass and Blais, 
2016). Besides age and socio-psychological factors, such as religiosity, party identification and 
political interest, electoral participation is strongly connected to an individual’s socioeconomic 
position, demonstrated by sharp differences in voting probabilities between various social classes 
and income groups (e.g. Leighley and Nagler, 2013; for Finland, see Martikainen, et al. 2005).  
 
The second criterion, concerning the volume of mobility, is more difficult to assess on the basis 
of previous research. Unlike inter-generational mobility rates, for which country-specific 
differences are well documented, comparable literature on intra-generational mobility is not 
available, probably due to far more demanding data requirements (Breen, 2004, 3). As a small 
and open economy, Finland is a dynamic society in which education is state-subsidized and other 
welfare-state benefits promote social mobility (Kvist et al. eds., 2012). This provides grounds to 
assume at least reasonable levels of intra-generational mobility. Due to lack of appropriate 
international comparisons, we will rely on our own data to test the level of mobility later in the 
analysis. 
 
Thirdly, the direction of causality between class and turnout is relatively clear. Although some 
studies have considered voting as an indicator of social capital (e.g. Macinko and Starfield, 
2001), it seems quite unlikely that voting would contribute to social and economic mobility rather 
than the other way around. However, it is not sufficient only to exclude the possibility of reverse 
causation. In addition, the possibility of spurious association should be excluded. There should be 
certain correlates of voting that are influenced by social mobility. We argue that both permanent 
and changeable factors account for a person’s propensity to vote in elections (Table 1). Whereas 
the stable elements in voting help to understand why the behavior of the socially mobile 
resembles that of their class of origin, the changeable elements help to understand why the 
behavior of movers resembles that of their class of destination.  
 




Biologically hereditable predispositions, differences in pre-adult political socialization, habitual 
character of voting and achieved level of education are the key factors contributing to the stable 
component in voting. A number of studies argue that there is a genetic predisposition to vote 
(Deppe et al., 2013; Fowler et al., 2008; Fowler and Dawes, 2008; for the opposite result, 
Charney and English, 2013). Moreover, parents, whether biological or not, have a strong role as 
socialization agents (Cesarini et al., 2014; Gidengil et al., 2016). Parents may encourage their 
offspring to vote either by example or via verbal advice (Wass, 2007). Consequently, the parental 
factors affecting the tendency to vote are likely to be partly biologically inherited and partly 
socially learned.  
 
In addition, the habitual character of voting (for review, see Aldrich et al., 2011) enhances 
stability in participation patterns. An individual’s first few elections are highly important in 
developing a voting habit (Franklin, 2004). Those who have adopted the habit of voting in early 
adulthood usually continue to vote whereas the opposite holds for early non-voters (Plutzer, 
2002).  
 
Achieved level of education is one of the strongest individual-level correlates of voting. Although 
its causal effect on turnout has recently been debated (e.g. Kam and Palmer, 2008; for a review 
Persson, 2015), education is associated with several indicators of political engagement, such as 
sense of civic duty, civic skills, political knowledge and political efficacy (Jackson, 1995; 
Persson, 2015). All of these increase an individual’s propensity to vote.1  
 
Turning to changeable elements in voting patterns, social class and income can be expected to 
influence voting via various mechanisms. These include resources, social networks, trust in 
political institutions, as well as assessment of social status and anxiety related to it (Table 1). 
Social class and income affect many resources that are relevant in accounting for participation, 
especially money and job skills (Brady et al. 1995). Changes in occupational positions lead to the 
development of novel skills. The skills required in more prestigious occupations are often those 
that also tend to foster participation (Brady et al., 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980, 22). 
Income is another factor closely related to social class position (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 
2006). By definition, higher income increases an individual’s economic resources. 
 
As higher social class is related to more extensive and intensive formal social networks (Pichler 
and Wallace, 2009), upward social mobility is likely to increase an individual’s propensity to 
become politically mobilized through churches, voluntary associations and political organizations 
(Rosenstone and Hansen, 2003, 32; Verba et al., 1995, 16–17). In addition, the character of 
informal social networks might change as a result of social mobility. Exposure to informal social 
networks in which voting is more common might boost a group pressure to participate and thus 
help an individual to develop a sense of civic duty to vote even if such a duty has not been 
acquired earlier in life.  
 
Changes in social status due to social mobility may also have an impact on voting through 
psychosocial factors, which can affect political efficacy. In population health research, poor 
health and well-being among groups situated lower in the hierarchy has been explained by a 
widespread sense of inferiority and stress (Delhey and Dragolov, 2014; Layte and Whelan, 2014). 
Applied to political engagement, status and status anxiety can affect both external and internal 
political efficacy. Achieving a higher social status may empower an individual to think that 
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he/she is able to influence what the government does (external efficacy) as well as increase their 
self-confidence in assessment of politics (internal efficacy). There is also a clear social class 
gradient in trust of institutions and politicians (Kouvo, 2010), which may be related to political 
efficacy, cultural similarity and social networks. In turn, a higher level of institutional trust 
increases turnout (e.g. Cox, 2003; Grönlund and Setälä, 2007). 
 
To summarize, the presence of both stable and changeable elements (Table 1) makes it plausible 
to assume the presence of gradient constraint in voting. This would imply that turnout among 
upwardly/downwardly socially and economically mobile individuals would settle between their 
socioeconomic group of origin and destination. The gradient-constraint hypothesis can be further 
disentangled into four interrelated components: 
 
1) The upwardly mobile individuals are more likely to vote than the stable members of their 
socioeconomic group of origin 
2) The upwardly mobile individuals are less likely to vote than the stable members of their 
socioeconomic group of destination  
3) The downwardly mobile individuals are less likely to vote than the stable members of their 
socioeconomic group of origin 
4) The downwardly mobile individuals are more likely to vote than the stable members of their 
socioeconomic group of destination 
 
We study intra-generational social mobility using two indicators of socioeconomic position, 
namely social class and income. The literature on gradient constraint has usually addressed 
occupational social class mobility, following the conventions of the sociological tradition in 
social stratification and mobility research (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 2002). Methodologically, 
change in social class can be specifically defined, which makes it a highly accurate measure of 
social mobility. In contrast to measures of income, for instance, class definition is more stable 
over time. Social class proxies main economic activity and also has a direct connection to an 
individual’s economic resources and social networks. Social class is also an interesting factor in 
turnout studies because of, for instance, its close connection to class voting (i.e. whether working 
class and middle class citizens have distinct party preferences). 
 
In addition of social class mobility, we examine the effect of income mobility. Besides having an 
independent effect on turnout (Martikainen et al., 2005; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980, 23–
26), income-related representational bias in parliamentary institutions is of major importance. 
Income is directly related to an individual’s position in important policy issues, such as level of 
welfare benefits or tax rates (Leighley and Nagler, 1992; 2013, 24). The interests of more affluent 
citizens often become better represented in political decision-making (for a review, Enns and 
Wlezien, 2011). Revealingly, income has been used as an independent variable in turnout studies 
more often than social class during the past decade (Smets and van Ham, 2013). 
 
 
Data and methods 
 
Our analyses are based on individual-level turnout data in the 2012 Finnish municipal elections. 
The data were compiled from those electoral wards that utilized electronic voter registration. 
These 211 electoral wards out of 2,265 covered 13.6 percent of the entire electorate (n=585,839 
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individuals). The data, administered by the Ministry of Justice, were released to Statistics Finland 
after the elections. In Statistics Finland, the information on whether a person voted or not was 
linked to information on the individual’s occupation-based social class and income (measured in 
2000 and 2011) as well as several other sociodemographic characteristics on the basis of personal 
identification numbers.  
 
Municipalities could decide themselves whether they preferred to use electronic registers and in 
which electoral wards. Since systematic random sampling was not applied in the selection the 
wards, the representativeness of the data to the Finnish electorate might be an issue. However, 
according to our diagnostics, the data are highly representative. Turnout rate in our data is one 
percentage point lower than the official turnout (57.3% vs. 58.3%, respectively). The 
distributions of gender, mother tongue, marital status and education also match reasonably well to 
official registers. Measured in the end of 2011, each category in each variable is less than one 
percentage point biased with two exceptions: the Swedish-speaking population is overrepresented 
by 1.7 percentage points and the population with secondary-level education is underrepresented 
by 1.3 points. 
 
The social class schema used here is based on the European Socio-economic Classification 
(ESeC, Rose and Harrison, 2007), which was formed on the basis of the ISCO88 codes2 of an 
individual’s current or previous occupation. For the sake of interpretability and hierarchal 
ordering, the original nine-class schema was collapsed using the five-class version of the model 
(Rose et al. 2010, 21). The self-employed classes (ESeC 4 and 5), accounting for eight percent of 
the total population, were further excluded from the analysis. 3  Besides making hierarchical 
comparison easier, this was necessary because the dataset does not include a variable indicating 
self-employment status. Measuring self-employment (especially ESeC 4 class) is, in turn, 
unreliable based solely on ISCO-codes. Our classification thus includes the following four 
categories: 1) “salariat” (professional, managerial and administrative occupations, i.e. ESeC 1 
and 2), 2) “intermediate” (higher grade white-collar, lower supervisory and lower technician 
occupations, i.e. ESeC 3 and 6), 3) “sales and service” (lower services, sales and clerical 
occupations, i.e. ESeC 7) and 4) “manual” (lower technical and routine occupations, i.e. ESeC 8 
and 9). Although the ESeC class schema is not meant to be necessarily hierarchical, here classes 
are ordered according to their voting propensities (class 1 is the most active whereas class 4 the 
least active). 
 
We measure income as an individual’s taxable income, which is derived from national tax 
records. It includes salary from paid work, income received from investments, pensions and most 
of the welfare benefits. Income is further ranked for both 2000 and 2011 as quartiles within the 
study population, in which the first quartile indicates the highest and the fourth quartile the 
lowest category of income. Ranking to quartiles instead of a continuous measure is chosen in 
order to facilitate comparisons. In addition, it is not reasonable to assume income mobility to be 
linearly associated with turnout, as income per se is not (Martikainen et al., 2005; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone, 1980).  
 
The analyses are conducted in three phases. First, in order to demonstrate the validity of our 
analysis, we assess the overall level of mobility in social class and income. The method of 
analysis is descriptive cross-tabulation. 
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Second, we conduct pairwise comparisons between movers and stayers in each category of social 
class by examining how turnout compares among movers between 2000 and 2011 with the 
turnout of the stable members in their social class of origin and destination. Third, the same 
analysis is performed using income as an indicator of mobility instead of social class. 
 
For second and third analysis, we ran a series of logistic regression models with the results 
reported as estimated voting probabilities for each mobility (and immobility) group dummies 
when holding control variables as observed (Hanmer and Kalkan, 2013). Logistic regression 
models were adjusted for gender age, education, voting in the 1999 parliamentary elections, and 
father’s and mother’s voting in the 1999 parliamentary elections. These variables are included in 
the model in order to encompass the stable factors, discussed in the previous section (Table 1). 4 
See Table A1 in the appendix for the distribution of the variables and turnout in each category of 
them.  
 
Education was measured at the end of 1998 and included four categories: 1) lower secondary 
(maximum nine years of education), 2) upper secondary (vocational school or academic upper-
secondary school), 3) lower degree level tertiary (2 to 4 years after the upper secondary level, 
vocational college, polytechnic or bachelor degree), and 4) higher degree-level tertiary (master or 
doctoral level degree).  
 
Data on voting in 1999 is derived from a unique data set compiled by Statistics Finland. The 
1999 data include the entire mainland Finnish electorate (for more information, Martikainen et 
al., 2005). Parental voting is used as a proxy for pre-adult intra-family political socialization, 
whereas an individual’s previous voting is used as a proxy for a habitual tendency to participate 
in elections. Parental voting is represented in five categories: 1) neither parent voted (which 
includes cases in which only one parent was alive but did not vote), 2) only the father voted 3) 
only the mother voted 4) both parents voted (or only one parent was alive and voted), and finally 
5) both parents were dead at the time of elections. An individual’s previous voting is a dummy 
variable.  
 
The analyses are limited to 30- to 48-year-olds at the end of 2000 who are followed up to 2012 
(i.e. 41- to 59-year-olds at the end of 2011 and 41- to 60-year-olds by the time of the 2012 
municipal elections held in October). According to previous literature, individuals begin to show 
maturity in terms of occupational attainment at their early 30s (Härkönen and Bihagen, 2011). On 
the other end, high rates of retirement after the age of 59 may bias the results, especially in the 
income analyses. Furthermore, in older age groups, the number of individuals with missing 
information on both parental voting and death grows rapidly. In our analyses, 11 percent of 
individuals were excluded as the result of missing parental information. This slightly skews our 
population in the oldest age groups. The proportion of 45–48 year-olds in our study would be 2.2 
percentage points higher without this exclusion (cf. Table A1), since older cohorts had an 
increasing number of missing parental data. The final sample includes 143,322 individuals for 
social class analyses and 150,709 for income analyses. 
 
The sensitivity analyses are conducted in three phases. First, we ran logistic models that include 
aggregated mobility variables instead of pairwise comparisons. This is done in order to assess the 
overall effect of mobility instead of specific pairs-wise comparisons and to compare the effect 
sizes between social class and income mobility. The advantage of this approach is that it enables 
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a more straightforward overall assessment of our hypothesis since there is a single coefficient that 
summarizes each of the four components of our hypothesis. The downside is that the results are 
more vague than when looking at each pair separately. Additionally, we ran this analysis 
stratified in two age groups, namely between 30-38-year-olds and 39-48-year-olds. Mobility 
among individuals in their thirties can still have a different character than among a population ten 
years older. It is possible, for example, that the youngest few cohorts have not achieved the 
sufficient occupational maturity, and hence play disproportionately large role in our results. 
 
Second, the analyses are replicated with a corresponding dataset from the 2015 parliamentary 
elections. In these elections, the electronic voting register included 1,081,814 individuals (24.2% 
of the total electorate) from 402 electoral wards and from 115 municipals. Turnout among the 
sample is 0.9 points lower than the official rate for the citizens living in Finland (69.2 vs 70.1 %). 
The distributions of gender and marital status match official registers closely: each category in 
both variables is biased by less than half a percentage point. However, education is biased 
towards secondary level qualifications by 2.0 percentage points. 
 
The 2015 dataset also included information on whether an individual was an employee or self-
employed, which produced a slightly more accurate measurement of social class. However, the 
results in 2015 elections change only marginally if we measure social class in a similar fashion as 
in the 2012 dataset (i.e. without information of self-employment, analysis not shown). Moreover, 
measurements of social class were made on the last day of 2000 and 2013, which causes some 
gap between the end of our follow-up and the election day in April 2015. This is nevertheless 
unlikely to produce a systematic bias to either direction, and compared to the length of the total 
follow-up period (13 years), this is still a relatively short episode. In turn, income was available 
in 2000 and 2014.  
 
Control variables (gender, age, education, voting in the 1999 elections and parental voting in 
1999) were essentially similar in both datasets. However, education was measured in 2000 
instead of 1998. The study population in the 2015 analysis covers those between 30- and 45-year-
olds in 2000. Compared to the main analysis, a slightly different age frame was chosen in order 
not to exceed the 59-year old age limit at the end of the follow-up. The final sample includes 
192,154 individuals for social class analysis and 234,767 for income analysis. 
 
In the final analysis, we aim to further interpret observed differences between contexts and 
socioeconomic measures by employing diagonal reference models (Sobel 1981, 1985), which 
have become the standard approach in the research of social mobility effects. Although they are 
not used widely in the gradient-constraint literature, these are used in order to gain further insight 
on the observed differences between the results our four contexts (2 elections x 2 SES measures). 
The analyses for both elections and socioeconomic indicators include two models. First, we test 
the relative weight of group of origin and destination for overall population. In the second model, 
we specify separate weight parameters for the upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals. The 






where  is the estimated log odds of voting in cell od which has i observations, γo is the social 
class / income quartile of origin and (identically coded) γd is the social class / income quartile of 
destination,  are the control variables (gender, age, education and own and parental voting 
in 1999). The weight term for the position of origin is p (∈ [0,1]). Correspondingly, the 
destination weight is 1-p. More substantially speaking, if p> 0.5 the origin has a larger effect than 
the destination and if p<0.5 the destination matters more. The situation where destination has no 
effect corresponds the p of 0 whereas p=1 indicates the situation in which origin has no effect.  
 
Second, to address whether there are differences between the effects of upward and downward 




where  is the weight of origin for upwardly mobile (i.e. if o>d),  is the 
weight of origin for downwardly mobile (if o<d). Finally, the weight parameter p is required for 
the estimation but, as having no substantial interpretation, it is not reported. Diagonal reference 
models were conducted using the gnm package in R (Turner and Firth, 2007), while all the other 
analyses have been performed with Stata13. 
 
When reporting our findings, we concentrate on the 2012 data and report the results from the 
2015 data mostly in the appendix. This is since the observed pattern with the 2012 data is more 
consistent and hence more illustrative. However, the replication with the 2015 data reveals 
additional insights, which suggest that the effect of social and income mobility on voting is a 
more multifaceted phenomenon that appears to be the case on the basis of 2012 data. By 







TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
We begin the analysis by examining the magnitude of social-class and income mobility. Table 2 
shows that social class and, even more so, income mobility is relatively common among 
individuals in their thirties and forties. Of our study population, between 2000 and 2011 as many 
as 25 percent had experienced social class mobility and 45 percent has experienced mobility in 
their income ranking. In addition, social class and income discrepancies in turnout are clearly 
visible. The difference in turnout between the lowest and the highest category on both of these 
measures is 23 percentage points in the 2012 Finnish municipal elections.  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
In Table 3, we assess our hypothesis by comparing the absolute turnout of each social class or 
income quartile pair and combination of the mobility between them between 2000 and 2011 
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based on cross tabulation. For instance, the highest row of the Table 3 shows that the voting 
propensity of those who belonged in the salariat in both 2000 and 2011 was 79 percent. The cell 
also shows a voting rate of 76 percent for those who were in the intermediate class in 2000 and 
the salariat in 2011, 75 percent for those who were in the salariat in 2000 and the intermediate 
class in 2011 and finally 69 percent for those who were in the intermediate class both in 2000 and 
2011.  
 
Overall, the descriptive results seem to lend support for all the four components of gradient-
constraint hypothesis in a clear-cut manner. The upwardly mobile individuals are more likely to 
vote than the stable members of their socioeconomic group of origin. The upwardly mobile 
individuals are less likely to vote than the stable members of their socioeconomic group of 
destination. The downwardly mobile individuals are less likely to vote than the stable members of 
their socioeconomic group of origin. The downwardly mobile individuals are more likely to vote 
than the stable members of their socioeconomic group of destination. This pattern can be 
observed when using either income or social class as an indicator of socioeconomic status. 
Interestingly, the upwardly mobile have a higher propensity to vote than the downwardly mobile 
with three exceptions, namely when mobility occurs between lower sales and service and manual 
classes and between intermediate and manual classes or between highest and third income 
quartile. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 1 shows the turnout propensity of each social class pair and combination of the mobility 
between them between 2000 and 2011. Corresponding logistic regression models are reported in 
the appendix (Table A2). This time, each combination of social class or income quartiles has a 
vertical “block” of its own. For instance, the cell in the furthest left in the upper part of the figure 
reveals that the voting propensity of those who belonged in the salariat in both 2000 and 2011 
was 69.8 percent. Turnout rate was 70.2 percent for those who were in intermediate class in 2000 
and salariat in 2011, 69.6 percent for those who were in salariat in 2000 and intermediate in 2011 
and finally 66.2 percent for those who were in intermediate class both in 2000 and 2011. 
 
Compared to descriptive results (Table 3), the differences in Figure 1 are much smaller, which 
seems logical since we included strong controls. This analysis can even be interpreted as a 
conservative test, since education in particular is not only correlated with voting in the 2012 
elections and an individual’s baseline social class or income quartile, but also his/her potential for 
future social mobility (Härkönen and Bihagen, 2011; Manzoni et al., 2014). 
 
For social class, the general pattern that socially mobile individuals’ turnout is between the stable 
members of their class of origin and destination persists in most cases. However, the difference is 
not significant in 9 out of 24 possible comparisons between the mobile groups and the 
corresponding stable groups at 95 percent confidence level. Most remarkably, the difference 
between stable intermediate and lower sales and service classes becomes insignificant and the 
relation to mobility between them spurious. In addition, turnout among mobile groups between 
the salariat and intermediate is as high as among the stable members of the salariat. This holds 
also when comparing the upwardly mobile from lower sales and service to the salariat to the 




When income is used as a measure of socioeconomic status instead of social class (lower part of 
the Figure 1), the overall picture becomes even clearer. Turnout among the mobile individuals 
always settles between the stable members of their income quartile of origin and destination. The 
difference is not significant in five out of the 24 possible comparisons between mobile and stable 
groups. These include the upwardly and downwardly mobile between quartiles 1 and 2 relative to 
stable 2, the upwardly and downwardly mobile between quartiles 2 and 3 relative to stable 3 and 
the upwardly mobile between quartiles 1 and 4 relative to stable 1. 
 
While detecting a general pattern is interesting per se, the obvious next question concerns effect 
sizes. One possible way to illustrate them is a comparison between the impact of social mobility 
and other factors. The estimation of voting probabilities from the same models of which Figure 1 
is based (including gender, age, education, voting in the 1999 elections and parental voting in 
1999, see Table A2) shows that the variation in difference in turnout between the upwardly 
mobile is 6.6 percentage points at the highest (from salariat to manual). The corresponding figure 
for the downwardly mobile is 5.3 points. This becomes close to the direct effect of having parents 
who both voted in the 1999 elections compared to non-voting parents (the difference of +7 point) 
(analysis not shown here). 5  Mobility from manual to intermediate class compared to stable 
members of manual class (+4.3 points) or from lower sales and service to salariat compared to 
stable sales and service (+4.0 points) is comparable with the effect of having a mother who voted 
compared to parents who neither voted (+4.0 points). 
 
Post-estimation from the income models reveals that the effect of moving from the lowest to the 
third income quartile (+ 4.2 points) is higher than that having a mother who voted compared to 
the reference group of having non-voting parents (+3.5 points). Correspondingly, moving from 
the lowest to the second quartile (+6.9 points) equals the positive effect of having two voting 
parents (+7.0 points). Upward mobility between the highest and lowest quartiles has an even 
stronger effect (+12.6 points). 
 
Finally, we evaluate the degree of how much intra-generational social mobility can narrow the 
overall social class and income gradient in turnout. Table 4 presents the estimated turnout 
differences between social classes / income quartiles in 2011 and compares how much smaller the 
difference is compared to the turnout of only stable individuals of corresponding groups. For 
example, with only stable individuals, the gap between salariat and manual classes would be 11.2 
per cent larger (1-(69.4-61.5)/(69.8-60.9)), and difference between highest and lowest income 





As a robustness check, we also present additional analysis, which includes aggregated mobility 
variables instead of pairwise comparisons (Table A3). Gradient constraint can also be detected 
here. The upwardly mobile are more active voters and the downwardly mobile more passive than 
the average members of their social class/income group of origin in 2000 (models in the first and 
third column). This addresses the first and third component of our hypothesis. To address the 
second and fourth component of our hypothesis, we need to compare the effect of mobility 
relative to their position of destination, which are shown in the second and fourth columns of 
Table A3. Here the upwardly mobile are still less active voters relative to their group of 
12 
 
destination. Correspondingly, the downwardly mobile are more active voters relative to their 
group of destination. Hence, the analysis in Table A3 validates all four components of our 
hypothesis.  
 
In Figure 1, using income as an indicator of socioeconomic position seems to lend stronger 
support for the gradient-constraint hypothesis compared to using social class as an indicator, and 
the results of Table 4 also suggest that income mobility narrows the differences between groups 
more than social class mobility. On the other hand, logistic regression models in Table A3 
suggest coefficients of roughly equal size. The differences might be related to two factors. First, 
there is more absolute income than social class mobility. Analysis in Table A3 obviously suffers 
much less from random variation arising from small cell sizes in mobile groups. Second, the 
stable highest and lowest income quartiles are of much smaller size and thus more selected than 
corresponding social classes (see Table 2). This causes larger difference between extreme groups 
and hence leaves more room for mobility effects.6 Moreover, this analysis suggests that upward 
mobility has a slightly stronger effect on turnout than downward mobility for social class, but not 
for income.  
 
Whether the results are robust according to the selected age frame is analyzed in Table A4. The 
age-stratified analysis shows similar patterns between 30-38-year-olds and 39-48-year-olds. If 
anything, results among the older age group are more consistent to our hypothesis.  
 
Appendices A5 to A12 show identical analysis conducted with the data from the 2015 
parliamentary elections. In the case of income, the pattern is in line with gradient-constraint 
hypothesis and even clearer than in the 2012 elections. Figure A7 shows that turnout among 
mobile individuals lies between stable members of their quartile of origin and destination and the 
difference between mobile and stable groups is statistically significant in every comparison.  
 
However, mobility in social class seems to support the hypothesis only partly. More precisely, 
deviance from the expected pattern can be detected among the upwardly mobile individuals, 
whose turnout is even higher than among the stable members of their class of destination in two 
cases, from intermediate to the salariat and from sales and service to intermediate. Also, in tables 
A11 and A12, the upwardly mobile do not have significantly lower levels of turnout relative to 
their class of destination measured in 2013. This observation does not lend support for the second 
component of the gradient constraint hypothesis, namely that upwardly mobile individuals are 
less likely to vote than stable members of their socioeconomic group of destination.  
 
In order to further investigate the observed differences between these four contexts, we estimated 
the relative weight of the positions of origin and destination with diagonal reference models 
(Sobel 1981, 1985). The weight parameters p and 1-p in models 1 of Table A13 show that the 
group of origin (p) accounts for roughly one third of the differences, while the group of 
destination (1-p) accounts for two-thirds in each case.7  However, the picture changes if we 
specify separate weights for the upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals, as is done in 
Models 2 (see also Figure A14). Here, social class and income mobility in 2012 and income 
mobility in the 2015 elections look similar to each other, with the weight of the group of origin 
ranging between 41 and 45 per cent for the downwardly mobile and between 27 and 29 per cent 
for the upwardly mobile. The case of social class mobility in the 2015 elections forms an 
exception. Here it is the higher social class position (rather than the class of destination) that 
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matters more compared to the other three contexts. In 2015, higher social class position 
accounted for 56 percent of the effect for the downwardly mobile and 86 percent for the upwardly 
mobile. The contextual difference is also seen in the likelihood-ratio tests between nested models 
1 and 2 which gave greatest statistical significance for social-class mobility in 2015 
(p<0.000001). The difference between income models is also significant in 2015 (p=0.0006), 
whereas in 2012 the difference between models are not significant with either measure of 




To our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to test the effect of intra-generational socio-
economic mobility in electoral participation. Using a rich register-based individual-level dataset 
from the 2012 Finnish municipal elections, turnout among socially mobile citizens was compared 
to turnout among stable members of their social class or income group of origin and destination. 
The results show that both social class and income mobility have clear associations with voting. 
Turnout rates among the mobile individuals settle between the averages of the members of their 
social class or income group of origin and destination who did not experience social mobility 
during the period covered in our analysis. This supports the gradient-constraint hypothesis. The 
pattern mostly remained after adjusting for education and own and parental voting in the 1999 
parliamentary elections, especially in the case of income mobility. Finally, for both social class 
and income mobility, the upwardly mobile are generally more active voters than the downwardly 
mobile, although the differences are not significant in many cases.  
 
As known on the bases of previous studies, a considerable proportion of social stratification in 
voting is attributable to inter-generational political socialization within the family and other 
factors situated in adolescence. Some scholars have even suggested that education, often the 
strongest correlate on voting among the components of socioeconomic status, merely proxies pre-
adult characteristics (Kam and Palmer, 2008; for review, Persson, 2015). Although our results do 
not directly address education, they suggest that changes in adult socioeconomic position indeed 
matter for voting. An individual’s social class and income position are connected to the turnout 
propensity in a fashion that is not fully attributable to education, voting in past elections, parental 
voting or former social class or income. Rather, the results suggest that individuals have a 
tendency to adjust their participation patterns to correspond to the standards of their new social 
standing. However, it should also be noted that the new position does not completely transfer into 
electoral participation, which is logical given the importance of the pre-adult and early adulthood 
elements.  
 
Assuming that the suggested changeable mechanisms presented in Table 1 vary with changes in 
social class and income and play any role in accounting for turnout, intra-generational social 
mobility functions as an ongoing mechanism that narrows turnout inequalities between social 
classes and income groups. That is, disparities in turnout would be even more pronounced in the 
hypothetical situation in which each individual’s social position would remain fixed at the point 
they turn 30, for instance. Also, the importance of our findings is underlined by the fact that 
social class mobility was a relatively common and income mobility even more common 




Finally, our sensitivity analyses show a clear pattern of gradient constraint also in the Finnish 
parliamentary elections of 2015 for income mobility but only partly so for social class mobility. 
In the latter case, the higher class position had a greater effect for an individual’s voting 
propensity regardless of whether it was the class of origin or destination. It is quite difficult to 
interpret what would cause these differences in results between indicators in 2015. In this study, 
we were not able to solve the issue whether the observed differences are attributable to the type 
of the elections or some other issue. However, the results point out the multi-faceted nature of 
this phenomenon, especially that the nature of social mobility effects on voting cannot be 
captured with only one indicator. Overall, we encourage further research on the topic about the 
specific ways different socioeconomic indicators influence voting in different electoral contexts. 
Finally, the results concerning social class mobility effect on voting in 2015 are also reassuring 
for political participation, even if from a somewhat different perspective. If the higher class is 
what counts even for the downwardly mobile, it implies that increasing levels of social mobility 
can lead to a higher level of overall turnout.  
 
Although register-based data used in this study entail obvious strengths, such as longitudinality, 
accuracy and statistical power, there are also restrictions in our analyses concerning the selection 
of the variables. When controls are added, it is well possible that we also control for some of the 
effect we aim to capture (i.e. the effect of mobility). Especially education has an effect not only 
on baseline social class/income quartile and turnout but also for the potential of social mobility 
during the follow-up. Another potential confounder is social mobility occurring between the end 
of 2011 and Election Day in October 2012. As this period is relatively short, the magnitude of 
mobility that remains uncovered is expected to be limited. Finally, the dataset does not include 
attitudinal factors such as sense of civic duty, political efficacy, trust in political institutions or 
indicators of social connectedness. We have suggested that changes in these factors may explain 
the changes in turnout among socially mobile individuals. Empirical tests for these mechanisms 
will thus be a subject for the future studies.  
 
As always in the case of country-specific studies, the degree of country-context sensitivity in our 
results should be tested. Societal significance of intra-generational mobility as a mechanism that 
suppresses turnout differences is related to at least two context-specific factors, namely overall 
inequality in turnout and level of social mobility. We argue that Finland constitutes a fairly good, 
although by no means exceptional, case according to both of these standards. In a global 
comparison, Finland has a relatively high rate of polarization in turnout when measured by 
income (Kasara and Suryanarayan, 2015, Fig. 1). This is also the case when using social class as 
a measure, at least when compared to other Nordic countries (Bengtsson et al., 2014, 52–55). 
Finland also has a quite high level of occupational mobility among the recent labor market 
entrants (Gangl, 2003). However, the level of combined occupational class and contract mobility 
among working-aged male population was somewhat lower than the EU average (Muffels and 
Luijkx, 2008). Intra-generational income mobility, too, was lower than average in an analysis of 
12 EU countries (Pavlopoulos et al., 2010).  
 
To conclude, our results suggest that in order to understand unevenly distributed turnout, changes 
taking place later in the life-cycle should be considered along with the pre- and early-adulthood 
factors. Moreover, it is important not only to study factors that cause inequalities in participation 
but also those that suppress them. As intra-generational social mobility has the tendency to 
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alleviate inequalities in voting, achieving an open society with a higher level of mobility may 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1 Stable elements after early adulthood and changeable elements due to intra-generational 
social mobility. 





Habitual character of voting, the importance of 
first few elections 
 
Achieved level of education 
Resources (skills, money, health) 
 → facilitate participation 
 
Formal social networks 
→ mobilization 
 
Informal social networks 
→ group norms, civic duty 
 
Status anxiety 
→ political efficacy 
 
Trust in institutions and politicians  

































Table 2 Social class and income mobility between 2000 and 2011 and turnout in the 2012 Finnish 
municipal elections (%). 
 
Social class 2011 
Social class 
2000 




Salariat 81 9 3 6 100 43,169 
Intermediate 22 55 13 10 100 22,255 
Sales and service 12 10 65 13 100 22,604 
Manual 7 4 8 81 100 55,294 
Total 33 14 16 37 100 143,322 
Turnout (%) 77 69 62 54 65  
 
Social class mobility between 2000 and 2011   
Upwards     14 20,398 
Stable     75 106,839 
Downwards     11 16,085 
       


















Highest quartile 67 19 8 7 100 37,692 
2. quartile 21 46 22 11 100 37,878 
3. quartile 8 24 46 22 100 37,504 
Lowest quartile 5 11 24 60 100 37,635 
Total 25 25 25 25 100 150,709 
Turnout (%) 76 69 63 53 65  
       
Income mobility between 2000 and 2011   
Upwards     23 34,844 
Stable     55 82,486 
Downwards     22 34,379 
       












Table 3 Turnout in the stable and mobile members of each social class and income quartile pair in 
the 2012 Finnish municipal elections (n: 143,322 for social class; n: 150,709 for income). 










Salariat – Intermediate 79 76 75 69 
Intermediate – Sales and service 69 66 64 63 
Sales and service – Manual 63 55 55 53 
Salariat – Sales and service 79 71 69 63 
Intermediate – Manual 69 61 61 53 
Salariat – Manual 79 66 64 53 











Highest – Second 78 73 71 70 
Second – Third 70 67 65 64 
Third – Lowest 64 59 57 49 
Highest – Third 78 70 70 64 
Second – Lowest 70 64 60 49 




Figure 1 Estimated turnout probability in the Finnish 2012 municipal elections (%) and 95 
percent confidence intervals by social class and income quartile pairs and mobility between them 
(n=143,322 for social class analysis; n=150,709 for income analysis). Based on logistic 
regression adjusted for gender, age, education and own and parental voting in 1999 parliamentary 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4. Turnout between social classes and income quartiles in 2012 Finnish municipal elections 
among all and only stable individuals. Column “difference constrained” shows how much the gap 
is smaller for all individuals compared to only stable individuals in the reference group (salariat 
or highest income quartile). 




% 95% c.i. % 95% c.i. 
Salariat 69.8 69.2–70.4 69.4 68.9–69.8 ref. 
Intermediate 66.2 65.4–67.0 66.7 66.0–67.2 25.0 
Lower sales & service 65.5 64.8–66.2 64.9 64.4–65.4 none 
Manual 60.9 60.4–61.3 61.5 61.1–61.9 11.2 
 




% 95% c.i. % 95% c.i. 
Highest 70.4 69.7–71.0 69.3 68.8–69.8 ref. 
Second 67.7 67.1–68.4 67.3 66.8–67.7 25.9 
Third 65.4 64.7–66.0 65.2 64.8–65.7 18.0 
Lowest 59.0 58.4–59.5 60.3 59.9–60.8 21.1 
 
Post-estimated from logit models adjusted by age, gender, education and own and parental voting 





Table A1 Distributions of the control variables and turnout in each group in the 2012 Finnish 
municipal elections in each group. 
 
Social class analysis Income analysis 
 
% Turnout (%) % Turnout (%) 
Age in 2000 
    
30–34 26 60 26 60 
35–39 27 63 27 63 
40–44 27 67 27 68 
45–48 20 71 20 71 
Gender     
Male  50 63 50 64 
Female 50 67 50 67 
Education      
Basic  16 49 17 50 
Secondary 45 60 46 61 
Lower tertiary 29 75 28 75 
Upper tertiary 10 85 9 86 
Voting in 1999     
No 33 37 32 37 
Yes 67 79 68 79 
Parental voting in 
1999 
    
Neither voted 9 49 9 49 
Only father voted 4 53 4 53 
Only mother voted 2 57 2 57 
Both voted  72 69 72 69 
Both dead 13 62 13 61 
     
























Table A2 Turnout in the 2012 Finnish municipal elections in social class and income mobility 
groups (logistic regression, log odds coefficients, standard errors in brackets). 
 
Social class model Income model 
Social class or  
income mobility  
(origin->destination) 
Stable 1 (ref.) 0 0 
2->1 0.02 (0.04)   -0.13 (0.03) 
3->1 -0.02 (0.05)   -0.15 (0.05) 
4->1 -0.13 (0.04)   -0.11 (0.06) 
1->2 -0.02 (0.04)   -0.12 (0.03) 
Stable 2 -0.20 (0.03)   -0.15 (0.03) 
3->2 -0.16 (0.05)   -0.22 (0.03) 
4->2 -0.25 (0.05)   -0.25 (0.04) 
1->3 -0.15 (0.06)   -0.13 (0.05) 
2->3 -0.30 (0.05)   -0.26 (0.03) 
Stable 3 -0.24 (0.03)   -0.28 (0.03) 
4->3 -0.40 (0.04)   -0.40 (0.03) 
1->4 -0.29 (0.05)   -0.36 (0.05) 
2->4 -0.31 (0.05)   -0.40 (0.04) 
3->4 -0.39 (0.05)   -0.50 (0.03) 
Stable 4 -0.48 (0.02)   -0.61 (0.02) 
Age 0.03 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) 
Gender 
  
Male (ref.) 0 0 
Female -0.07 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 
Education 
  
Basic (ref.) 0 0 
Secondary 0.26 (0.02)  0.26 (0.02) 
Lower tertiary 0.58 (0.02)  0.69 (0.02) 
Higher tertiary 1.00 (0.03)  1.10 (0.03) 
Voting in 1999  
  
No (ref.) 0 0 
Yes 1.59 (0.01) 1.59 (0.01) 
Parental voting in 1999 
 
Neither voted (ref.) 0 0 
Only father voted 0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 
Only mother voted 0.20 (0.05) 0.18 (0.04) 
Both voted  0.39 (0.02) 0.40 (0.02) 
Both dead 0.22 (0.03) 0.22 (0.03) 
Constant -1.73 (0.06) -1.90 (0.06) 














Table A3 Turnout in the 2012 Finnish municipal elections by social class and income and 










Social class or income 
quartile 
   
1 (ref.) 0 0 0 0 
2 -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.14*** 
3 -0.24*** -0.28*** -0.31*** -0.28*** 
4 -0.46*** -0.47*** -0.55*** -0.57*** 
Mobility 2000–2011 
    
Up 0.20*** -0.06** 0.16*** -0.09*** 
Stable (ref.) 0 0 
 
0 
Down -0.13*** 0.11*** -0.15*** 0.09*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 143,322 143,322 150,709 150,709 






























Table A4 Turnout in the 2012 Finnish municipal elections among two age groups and mobility 










30-38-year-olds in 2000 
Social class or 
income quartile   
  1 (ref.) 0 0 0 0 
2 -0.20*** -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.11*** 
3 -0.28*** -0.31*** -0.29*** -0.24*** 
4 -0.48*** -0.48*** -0.47*** -0.50*** 
Mobility 2000-2011  
 
  Up 0.23*** -0.04 0.14*** -0.09*** 
Stable 
(ref.) 
0 0 0 0 
Down -0.13*** 0.11*** -0.17*** 0.03 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 68,211 68,211 71,475 71,475 
     39-48-year-olds in 2000 
Social class or 
income quartile     
1 (ref.) 0 0 0 0 
2 -0.16*** -0.21*** -0.15*** -0.17*** 
3 -0.20*** -0.25*** -0.33*** -0.32*** 
4 -0.45*** -0.47*** -0.63*** -0.63*** 
Mobility 2000-2011  
   
Up 0.15*** -0.09** 0.16*** -0.11*** 
Stable 
(ref.) 
0 0 0 0 
Down -0.12*** 0.12*** -0.16*** 0.13*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 75,111 75,111 79,234 79,234 


















Table A5 Social class and income mobility between 2000 and 2013 and turnout in the 2015 
Finnish parliamentary elections (%). 
  
Social class 2013 
Social class 
Salariat Intermediate Sales and service Manual 
Total 
2000 % (n) 
Salariat 83 9 3 5 100 61,356 
Intermediate 25 56 11 8 100 28,237 
Sales and 
service 
15 11 63 11 100 30,420 
Manual 7 4 8 81 100 72,141 
Total 36 14 15 35 100 192,154 
Turnout (%) 87 81 72 65 76  
       Social class mobility between 2000 and 2013 
  
Upwards 
    
15  28,429 
Stable 
    
75 144,882 
Downwards 
   
10 18,843 
Total         100 192,154 
       
  Income 2014 
Income Highest 2. 3. 
Lowest quartile 
Total 
2000 quartile quartile quartile % (n) 
Highest 
quartile 
64 19 9 8 100 59,013 
2. quartile 22 43 23 13 100 59,616 
3. quartile 9 26 43 22 100 58,015 
Lowest quartile 6 13 25 56 100 58,123 
Total 25 25 25 25 100 234,767 
Turnout (%) 86 79 74 62 75  
       Income mobility between 2000 and 2011 
  
Upwards 
    
24 55,288 
Stable 
    
52 121,240  
Downwards 
   
25 58,239 
       
Total         100 234,767 











Table A6 Turnout in the stable and mobile members of each social class and income quartile pair 
in the 2015 Finnish parliamentary elections (n: 192,154 for social class; n: 234,767 for income). 
Social class mobility 2000–2013 










Salariat – Intermediate 88 87 86 80 
Intermediate – Sales and service 80 79 76 73 
Sales and service – Manual 73 66 64 64 
Salariat – Sales and service 88 82 80 73 
Intermediate – Manual 80 74 72 64 
Salariat – Manual 88 79 78 64 
     
Income mobility 2000–2014 










Highest – Second 88 85 81 80 
Second – Third 80 78 75 74 
Third – Lowest 74 70 67 57 
Highest – Third 88 82 78 74 
Second – Lowest 80 75 69 57 
Highest – Lowest 88 81 73 57 























Figure A7 Estimated turnout probability in the Finnish 2015 parliamentary elections (%) and 95 
percent confidence intervals by social class and income quartile pairs and mobility between them 
(n= 192,154 for social class analysis; n= 234,767 for income analysis). Based on logistic 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A8. Turnout between social classes and income quartiles in the 2015 Finnish parliamentary 
elections among all and only stable individuals. Column “difference constrained” shows how 
much the gap is smaller for all individuals compared to stable individuals only in the reference 
group (salariat or highest income quartile). 




% 95% c.i. % 95% c.i. 
Salariat 80.9 80.5–81.4 80.8 80.4–81.1 ref. 
Intermediate 78.2 77.6–78.9 78.9 78.4–79.3 29.6 
Lower sales & service 75.3 74.8–75.9 75.3 74.8–75.7 1.7 
Manual 71.9 71.5–72.2 72.4 72.1–72.7 6.7 
      




% 95% c.i. % 95% c.i. 
Highest 82.0 81.6–82.5 80.9 80.5–81.3 ref. 
Second 78.1 77.6–78.6 77.5 77.2–77.8 12.8 
Third 75.0 74.6–75.5 75.2 74.9–75.5 18.6 
Lowest 66.7 66.3–67.2 69.0 68.6–69.3 22.2 
Post-estimated from logit models adjusted by age, gender, education and own and parental voting 






























Table A9 Distributions of the control variables and turnout in each group in the 2015Finnish 
parliamentary elections. 
 
Social class analysis Income analysis 
 
% Turnout (%) % Turnout (%) 
Age in 2000 
    
30–34 30 73 30 72 
35–39 32 75 32 75 
40–45 38 79 37 78 
Gender     
Male  49 75 50 74 
Female 51 78 50 77 
Education      
Basic  14 59 16 58 
Secondary 45 71 46 72 
Lower tertiary 30 85 29 85 
Upper tertiary 11 93 10 92 
Voting in 1999     
No 33 52 34 51 
Yes 67 88 66 88 
Parental voting in 
1999 
    
Neither voted 15 64 15 62 
Only father voted 6 68 6 67 
Only mother voted 5 71 5 69 
Both voted  70 80 69 79 
Both dead 5 74 5 73 
     


























Table A10 Turnout in the 2015 Finnish parliamentary elections in social class and income 
mobility groups (logistic regression, log odds coefficients, standard errors in brackets). 
 
Social class model Income model 
Social class or  
income mobility  
(origin->destination) 
Stable 1 (ref.) 0 0 
2->1 0.15 (0.04) -0.11 (0.03) 
3->1 -0.03 (0.04) -0.27 (0.04) 
4->1 -0.11 (0.04) -0.21 (0.05) 
1->2 0.04 (0.04) -0.22 (0.03) 
Stable 2 -0.20 (0.03) -0.29 (0.02) 
3->2 -0.06 (0.05) -0.38 (0.03) 
4->2 -0.25 (0.05) -0.50 (0.03) 
1->3 -0.18 (0.07) -0.37 (0.04) 
2->3 -0.31 (0.05) -0.41 (0.03) 
Stable 3 -0.39 (0.03) -0.50 (0.02) 
4->3 -0.52 (0.04) -0.61 (0.03) 
1->4 -0.24 (0.05) -0.66 (0.04) 
2->4 -0.36 (0.06) -0.66 (0.03) 
3->4 -0.62 (0.04) -0.73 (0.03) 
Stable 4 -0.61 (0.02) -0.99 (0.02) 
Age 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 
Gender 
  
Male (ref.) 0 0 
Female -0.10 (0.01) 0.10 (0.01) 
Education 
  
Basic (ref.) 0 0 
Secondary 0.34 (0.02) 0.34 (0.01) 
Lower tertiary 0.65 (0.02) 0.80 (0.02) 
Higher tertiary 1.13 (0.04) 1.22 (0.03) 
Voting in 1999  
  
No (ref.) 0 0 
Yes 1.66 (0.01) 1.65 (0.01) 
Parental voting in 1999 
 
Neither voted (ref.) 0 0 
Only father voted 0.10 (0.03) 0.12 (0.02) 
Only mother voted 0.15 (0.03) 0.18 (0.03) 
Both voted  0.38 (0.02) 0.39 (0.01) 
Both dead 0.21 (0.03) 0.22 (0.03) 
Constant -0.85 (0.06) -1.11 (0.05) 







Table A11 Turnout in the 2015 Finnish parliamentary elections by social class and income and 















Class 2000 Class 2013 Income 2000 Income 2014 
Social class or income quartile 
   1 (ref.) 1 1 1 1 
2 -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.24*** -0.29*** 
3 -0.39*** -0.43*** -0.48*** -0.50*** 
4 -0.62*** -0.61*** -0.87*** -0.92*** 
Mobility 2000-2013 
    Up 0.31*** -0.02 0.29*** -0.11*** 
Stable (ref.) 1 1 1 1 
Down -0.14*** 0.18*** -0.23*** 0.18*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table A12 Turnout in the 2015 Finnish parliamentary elections among two age groups and 
mobility between them (logistic regression, log odds coefficients). 
30-38-year-olds in 2000 
   Social class or income quartile  
    Class 2000 Class 2013 Income 2000 Income 2014 
1 (ref.) 0 0 0 0 
2 -0.20*** -0.15*** -0.26*** -0.29*** 
3 -0.41*** -0.45*** -0.50*** -0.48*** 
4 -0.63*** -0.62*** -0.82*** -0.88*** 
Mobility 2000-2011  
    
Up 0.31*** -0.04 0.29*** -0.09*** 
Stable (ref.) 0 0 0 0 
Down -0.20*** 0.12*** -0.22*** 0.17*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 107,578 107,578 132,018 132,018 
 
    
39-45-year-olds in 2000 
   
Social class or income quartile 
   
1 (ref.) 0 0 0 0 
2 -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.31*** 
3 -0.37*** -0.39*** -0.46*** -0.52*** 
4 -0.59*** -0.58*** -0.93*** -0.97*** 
Mobility 2000-2011  
    
Up 0.32*** 0.02 0.27*** -0.15*** 
Stable (ref.) 0 0 0 0 
Down -0.04 0.27*** -0.26*** 0.19*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 84,576 84,576 102,749 102,749 

























Table A13 Parameters of diagonal reference models on the effect of social class and income mobility on turnout of the Finnish municipal elections 




































Reference categories: man, basic education, did not vote in 1999, neither parent voted in 1999. Models 2 show the weight parameters with separate dummies for 
upward and downward mobility.
 
Municipal elections 2012 Parliamentary elections 2015 
 
Social class Income Social class Income 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
 
b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE 
Weight parameters 


















































Social class or income quartile 
               1 -1.70 (0.06) -1.72 (0.06) -1.92 (0.06) -1.92 (0.06) -0.79 (0.06) -0.83 (0.06) -1.12 (0.05) -1.14 (0.05) 
2 -1.89 (0.06) -1.91 (0.06) -2.07 (0.06) -2.07 (0.06) -0.95 (0.06) -1.02 (0.06) -1.40 (0.05) -1.42 (0.05) 
3 -1.98 (0.06) -1.99 (0.06) -2.20 (0.06) -2.20 (0.06) -1.23 (0.06) -1.29 (0.06) -1.59 (0.05) -1.61 (0.05) 
4 -2.20 (0.06) -2.21 (0.06) -2.51 (0.06) -2.51 (0.06) -1.44 (0.06) -1.47 (0.06) -2.07 (0.05) -2.09 (0.05) 
Covariates 
                Age 0.03 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 
Woman  -0.07 (0.01) -0.07 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) -0.10 (0.01) -0.09 (0.01) 0.10 (0.01) 0.10 (0.01) 
Secondary education 0.27 (0.02) 0.27 (0.02) 0.26 (0.02) 0.26 (0.02) 0.34 (0.02) 0.34 (0.02) 0.34 (0.01) 0.34 (0.01) 
Lower tertiary education 0.58 (0.02) 0.58 (0.02) 0.69 (0.02) 0.69 (0.02) 0.65 (0.02) 0.65 (0.02) 0.80 (0.02) 0.80 (0.02) 
Higher tertiary education 0.99 (0.03) 0.99 (0.03) 1.10 (0.03) 1.10 (0.03) 1.11 (0.03) 1.13 (0.03) 1.23 (0.03) 1.23 (0.03) 
Voting in 1999  1.60 (0.01) 1.60 (0.01) 1.59 (0.01) 1.59 (0.01) 1.66 (0.01) 1.66 (0.01) 1.65 (0.01) 1.65 (0.01) 
Only father voted 0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 0.11 (0.03) 0.11 (0.03) 0.12 (0.02) 0.12 (0.02) 
Only mother voted 0.21 (0.05) 0.20 (0.05) 0.18 (0.04) 0.18 (0.04) 0.15 (0.03) 0.15 (0.03) 0.18 (0.03) 0.18 (0.03) 
Both voted  0.39 (0.02) 0.39 (0.02) 0.40 (0.02) 0.39 (0.02) 0.38 (0.02) 0.38 (0.02) 0.39 (0.01) 0.39 (0.01) 
Both dead 0.22 (0.03) 0.22 (0.03) 0.22 (0.03) 0.22 (0.03) 0.21 (0.03) 0.21 (0.03) 0.21 (0.03) 0.21 (0.03) 
AIC 157,066 157,064 164,398 164,397 174,880 174,852 215,762 215,752 
N 143,322 143,322 150,709 150,709 192,154 192,154 234,767 234,767 
Figure A14 Relative weights of the socioeconomic position of origin and destination (%), based 





























































                                                 
1  Compared to other stable elements in Table 1, education is admittedly less permanent since an individual’s 
educational qualifications can change even after early adulthood. In practice, however, the proportion of the 
population whose educational qualifications increase after reaching their thirties is small. (In the follow-up of our 
study, the proportion of those was 7 %). In addition, the direction of the causality is clear since education influences 
adulthood social class (which, in turn, influences income), whereas changes in social class position do not affect 
achieved level of education. 
2  The ESeC matrices were accessed on the resource website of the European Socio-economic Classification 
(https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/archives/esec). 
3 Most of the differences between the sample sizes of the income and social class included in the analyses is related 
to this exclusion, which was not made for income models.  
4 Unfortunately, genetic influences cannot be measured directly with the data at our disposal. 
5 Of course, since parental turnout is situated very early in the causal chain of the factors included in our models, a 
large share of its effect is likely to be indirect, namely mediated via other factors in the models.  
6 Also in the descriptive Table 2, turnout gap is almost identical for income quartiles and social classes in 2011. 
7 The greater weight of the class of destination is largely accountable by inclusion of covariates (except for income in 
2015). This is reasonable since they are determined earlier in the life course and thus more proximate to the 
measurement of the class of origin. Models without covariates would give origin weights (p) of 0.48 for social class 
and 0.42 for income in 2012 elections; and 0.46 for social class and 0.36 for income in 2015 elections. 
